Naval engineers Luis Javier Picco and Juan Luis Sánchez Pastrana, responsible for technical 'advice' to INIDEP

Opinion Article: Overpricing, Conflicts of Interest, and Corruption in Fishing (Part 3 of 4

ARGENTINA
Saturday, January 24, 2026, 00:00 (GMT + 9)

From the information gathered, it could be presumed—subject to judicial investigation—that the bidding processes for the research vessels “Víctor Angelescu” and “Mar Argentino” were steered so that the Spanish provider Armón Vigo would be the awardee. This resulted in an evident harm to the national treasury, the Argentine shipbuilding industry, technological development, and job creation.

Although it was known within port circles that INIDEP would tender the construction of two fisheries research vessels, no national shipyard was formally notified. The Federation of the Argentine Shipbuilding Industry (FINA); the Bonaerense Association of the Shipbuilding Industry (ABIN) and Argentine shipyards were never informed or invited to quote. No national shipyard was granted access to the bidding documents in a timely and proper manner (Decree 1023/2001) to be able to present themselves for the opening of bids on September 2, 2015.

The Director of INIDEP Otto Christian Whöler, faced with only one offer, should have annulled the tender; but «relied on the fact that the invitation to participate in the tender was made to about 20 shipyards from all over the world and a Chamber of Shipyards from Spain» (sic). The apparent justification for not convening national shipyards was that they lacked sufficient background for the construction of ships with similar characteristics. This is an absolutely objectionable point and, in any case, something to be evaluated by experts—since Whöler is not one—after the submission of offers. As I mentioned in the previous article, national shipyards could have even presented themselves in partnership with other national or foreign shipyards; therefore, the decision not to invite them to the tender was irregular.

Furthermore, the Director of INIDEP Whöler, in a meeting with the Argentine Association of Naval Engineering (AAIN), allegedly admitted that «the Institute hired a Spanish expert to draft the bidding documents and that he had determined the exclusion of local shipyards due to a supposed lack of experience in meeting noise insulation standards». The expert summoned—as we shall see—had a close relationship with the Armón Shipyard. This was reportedly denounced to the National Undersecretary of Industry.

The award was finally granted to the Armón Shipyard of Vigo. It was not necessary to “cartelize” the offer since there was only one bidder who quoted—prima facie—the overvalued sum of 27.72 million dollars. This quote appears to be outside market rates for a 52-meter research vessel, considering that the fisheries training vessel “Intermares” (79 meters long), also built at Armón, cost 22.3 million euros, and the vessels “Ramón Margalef” and “Angeles Alvariño” (used as a basis by INIDEP for the tender) had costs below 20 million euros; which suggests that the “Víctor Angelescu” quote of 27.72 million USD included an overprice of approximately 5 to 7 million USD.

Despite the complaints, the construction was awarded to Armón on November 24, 2015, disregarding “Buy Argentine” requirements and other legislation. Armón also benefited from not having to register in the Argentine State Providers Registry (SIPRO/COMPR.AR), which creates competitive disadvantages for companies based in Argentina due to bureaucratic reasons, additional costs, and higher formal risks. “National preference” fails to compensate for the bureaucratic differences, unfair competition, and asymmetries caused by foreign subsidies, resulting in a lower award rate for national companies in major international projects.

The opening of bids for the second ship “Mar Argentino” was set for October 30, 2015. Here, Argentine shipyards were summoned on September 17, 2015, providing insufficient time to present the extensive required documentation. Decree 1023/2001 was barely complied with as only 43 calendar days were granted; however, the World Bank establishes a minimum of 45 days, the European Union sets a minimum of 52 days, and Development Banks provide between 45 and 90 days to broaden competition.

Additionally, Argentine shipyards were forced to **quote in pesos—at least 30% of the vessel's value—**which constituted a very significant disadvantage compared to foreigners, especially with a rising dollar. Even so, one offer was reportedly lower than Armón's, yet a cost increase of nearly 20% was subsequently authorized, highlighting a false initial offer during the 2/15 tender for the coastal vessel “Mar Argentino.” All these matters warrant a judicial expert report.

Furthermore, Argentine bidders were allegedly denied (March 8, 2016) the right to view the offers under the pretext that the IDB does not authorize it (?). This refusal undermines the transparency of the award process and prevents the challenging of offers and verification of compliance with the bidding documents. On June 30, 2016, INIDEP Director Otto Christian Whöler notified that the construction was awarded to the Armón Shipyard, and on August 2, 2016, the same official indicated that the regulations did not provide for a review of the file (?), once again showing a non-transparent process.

This concealment makes it clear that INIDEP authorities never planned to award the construction to a national shipyard. Regarding the failed tender for the Ice-Class research vessel, it is striking that on September 6, 2023, the media outlet “Faro de Vigo” already announced it would be awarded to Armón Shipyard, and the preliminary project was reportedly based on the vessel “Odeón de Buen,” which was coincidentally being built at that shipyard for the Spanish Institute of Oceanography.

Juan Luis Sanchez Pastrana Marine Advisor in Astur Marine S.L

Naval Engineer Raúl Podetti (Ser Industria, 2023) describes the tenders as "gross frauds" designed to benefit Armón. He accuses INIDEP Director Wöhler of commissioning the design to a **Spanish naval engineer—a regular consultant for the winning shipyard—**while excluding Argentine experts. He indicates that a bid scoring system was used to penalize national proposals. He extended this complaint to the third tender projected for 2023. Podetti estimated that the first two tenders generated significant overcosts: «In the case of the "Victor Angelescu," between 8 and 10 million USD; for the "Mar Argentino," between 2 and 3 million USD; and for the third unbuilt vessel, it would have been around 45 million USD. That is, a total of between 55 and 58 million USD in overpricing (…) The bidding documents were tailored for Armón by adding unnecessary requirements (e.g., Ice-Class) (…) the accusations focus on bidding fraud, corruption, and favoritism toward foreign industry (…) INIDEP acted as an agent for Armón (…) there was concealment of information (…) loss of naval sovereignty (…) and disregard for Argentine legislation».

According to this Naval Engineer, the reported facts are divided into two periods:

a) Between 2015-2019 INIDEP conducted two tenders with IDB financing to acquire fisheries research vessels. The tenders/contracts give rise to well-founded suspicions of fraud, collusion, and corruption involving the mentioned companies and institutions, and eventually IDB officials. Everything indicates that an illicit association was formed between INIDEP officials; "ad hoc" hired advisors; a Spanish shipyard; a Spanish consultancy and possibly IDB officials to unduly favor a private Spanish company and cause grave harm to Argentina-IDB. These suspicions are enumerated by Podetti and «considers INIDEP Director Otto Christian Wöhler responsible. For the design of the ships and the tender, INIDEP did not hire a team of Argentine naval engineers, but instead, INIDEP assembled a technical team incapable of performing the tasks, including biologists, sound technicians, and high school graduates who relied on the advice of the Spanish naval professional. For this, INIDEP chose—from thousands of naval engineers worldwide—Juan Luis Sánchez Pastrana, an associate and neighbor of the Armón Shipyard».

The two vessels built by Armon Shipyards for INIDEP

«The reason for the choice of Sánchez Pastrana by INIDEP and the IDB was based on his advice for a naval project in Mexico that “coincidentally” concluded with the hiring of the Armón Shipyard in Spain. Years ago, Sánchez Pastrana had founded the consultancy “Astur Marine” whose website lists the designs of the INIDEP research vessels built at Armón as their own (Editor's Note: demonstrating the bias of this INIDEP advisor). This consultancy, belonging to the expert chosen by INIDEP, is “coincidentally” located only seven minutes from the Armón shipyard, and a large part of its advisory work has been performed for this shipyard. INIDEP relied on a report by Sánchez Pastrana to choose a design "tailored for Armón" and, the shipyard granted “Astur Marine” a million-dollar contract for the technical management of the INIDEP vessel construction. Furthermore, INIDEP used a report by Sánchez Pastrana to disqualify and remove the Argentine naval industry from the tender, considering it incapable of building such a ship despite having built hundreds of more complex vessels. Several years ago, an Argentine shipyard had already built a fisheries research vessel that until recently was the most modern in the region. This project was carried out with IDB financing after a transparent international tender with the participation of several global bidders».

«Of the hundreds of capable foreign shipyards—98 regular builders of these vessels—only the Spanish shipyard Armón submitted a bid (?). This is because only they were able to meet the exaggerated technical requirements within very short deadlines, as it was effectively a “tailored” document. To ensure Argentine shipyards did not compete, INIDEP included technical and administrative requirements aimed at disqualifying them. To make them more expensive than Armón's, a tax treatment and a disadvantageous exchange rate for Argentines were designed—exactly the opposite of what a government promoting national industry should do».

Regarding the inspection of the work in Spain—Podetti continues—«from among hundreds of Argentine naval engineers, INIDEP chose Eng. Luis Javier Picco, who is a commercial agent for the Spanish shipyard Armón, which he was supposedly meant to oversee. As a technical representative and INIDEP inspector, Picco authorized a suspicious contract expansion (approx. 25%) in favor of Armón Shipyards. This advisor, besides being a commercial manager for Armón in the region, acted commercially in the private sector with fishing companies. Strangely, INIDEP executives maintained a suspicious preference for Armón, ignoring Armón's corruption scandals in Panama (156 million USD and 10% in bribes) in situations similar to those generated in the Argentine tenders».

Naval Eng. Picco has invested in livestock matters and here appears with his wife receiving a Shorthorn Grand Champion Female award at Palermo 2025. Photo: courtesy of Clarín

b) Between events after 2021 Eng. Podetti states that, «in the year 2022, and in middle of the crisis and complaints, the then-Director of INIDEP Lic. Oscar Horacio Padín took three stances:

First, in June 2022 INIDEP spent a large budget to take the ship built in Spain by Armón to Montevideo “on display.” This unprecedented commercial move by INIDEP in favor of the Spanish shipyard occurred at a very opportune moment. Coincidentally Uruguay was considering replacing its fisheries research vessel “Aldebarán” and Armón Shipyard was negotiating its construction. By a strange paradox, the “Aldebarán” vessel being replaced was built years ago in Argentina through a genuine and transparent international tender financed by the IDB; but, despite this, no one from the Argentine naval industry was invited by INIDEP on this promotional trip made by Argentina to favor Spanish industry and harm all Argentines who paid for the trip. Taking a ship to a foreign country to show it to a potential buyer is the boldest and most costly naval commercial action; yet it occurred with INIDEP’s approval regarding Armón Shipyard.

Second, a few months ago Armón Shipyard had begun construction of a new fisheries research vessel design suitable for use in polar regions. “Coincidentally” INIDEP indicated it needed a third ship with technical characteristics “matching” those of the new Armón design, with a budget close to 100 million USD—double that of the previous ships.

Third, in September 2022 INIDEP initiated procedures before the National Undersecretary of Industry requesting to import this third ship, thus avoiding compliance with the local construction requirement imposed by Argentine law, arguing that IDB financing would allow them to import without restrictions». And the responsible officials?

'Bidding for INIDEP's “Ice Class” vessel begins', as announced by Revista Puerto on August 31, 2023

Eng. Podetti did not limit himself to being a qualified observer; he filed the corresponding complaints with the Office of Institutional Integrity (OII) of the IDB against the aforementioned Otto Christian Whöler.

For his part, Domingo Contessi, head of Federico Contessi Shipyard, «questioned the awards to Armón for the research vessels, focusing his criticism on the lack of transparency in the bidding processes; specifications that favored foreign shipyards (such as similarities with Armón designs for Spain) and the negative impact on the Argentine naval industry. His statements align with those of the Federation of the Argentine Shipbuilding Industry for prioritizing foreign interests. Regarding the “Mar Argentino,” he referred to it as an “obscure process” due to unfavorable conditions for local industry and criticized the vessel's technical specifications, which were similar to another already provided by Armón in Spain. He considered that the import—funded by the National State—violated Article 15 of Law 27.418 by not giving priority to national construction despite the country's shipyards having sufficient technical capacity. He made many more observations to both outgoing and incoming authorities».

Luis Javier Picco and Ramón Basanta integrated the delegation that received the IDB representatives. During the meeting, an ambitious vision for the institutional future was proposed through the proposal of a vessel with ICE CLASS (ICE 1C) certification. Photo: INIDEP

Naval Engineer Horacio Tettamanti of SPI Shipyard and former Undersecretary of Ports, for his part, criticized the construction in Spain. In Radio Brisas (July 16, 2020); Open Letter and other forums, he stated that «it was a strategic error, as local industry has the technical and labor capacity to execute it, fostering employment and technological sovereignty. The tender for that ship deliberately excluded Argentine shipyards; for example, unnecessary Ice-Class requirements for the South Atlantic. He alleged a bias in favor of European providers and emphasized that the cost could have been reduced by 20–30% in Argentina with free technology transfer via the IDB and applied labor. National preference was ignored, representing a chronic dependency as no country gives away its resources. The Argentine Shipbuilding Industry generates about 5,000 direct jobs, and approximately 300 jobs were lost due to these imports. It reflects an exclusively financial vision that ignored the added value of local construction. Argentina is in a position to build any type of vessel, including complex oceanographic ones. It should have been built in Mar del Plata. Building it in Spain generated a net loss of 70–90 million dollars over 5 years for the Argentine economy, mainly due to capital flight, lost employment, and suppliers (Techint steel, local electronics, etc.)». According to the Argentine Naval Chamber and Tettamanti, every dollar invested in local shipyards multiplies by three to four in the economy versus one for imports.

Other naval engineers (in a 2015 letter) questioned the exclusion of local shipyards.

SiMaPe; SOMU and ATE from Río Santiago Shipyards alleged “tailored bidding documents” in favor of Armón.

The Argentine Association of Naval Engineering (2015) filed a complaint similar to those of engineers Podetti and Tettamanti, highlighting the lack of transparency in the process.

Specialized media such as Pescare and Revista Puerto reported errors in the design; for example, the absence of outriggers for shrimp fishing despite it being Argentina's main export species, which implies an operational overcost. Meanwhile, Punto Noticias linked “corruption to the preference for imports, with the consequent loss of local labor and million-dollar overcosts.”

Tendering the construction of a vessel must not only generate an asset but also national development and the well-being of its people. In the next article (4/4), the inefficiency of INIDEP's vessels is shown.

Expert in South Atlantic and Fishing.

Former Secretary of State.

President of the Center for Latin American Fishing Studies (CESPEL)

President of the Agustina Lerena Foundation      www.cesarlerena.com      .ar

This article represents the opinion of the signatory. The opinion articles published do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of this medium. Fish Info & Services is an independent medium, open to the opinions of its readers. If you wish to publish, contact us at [email protected]

Related News:

• Opinion Article: Overpricing, conflict of interest and corruption in the sector (Note 1/4)

• Opinion Article: Overpricing, Conflict of Interest, and Corruption in Fishing (Part 2/4)

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